Hospital competition, GP fundholders and waiting times in the UK internal market: the case of elective surgery.
In this paper I model the demand for and supply of elective surgery using a modified Hotelling framework in which time, money, and distance are determinants of the demand for hospital care. Hospitals compete with each other in terms of the waiting time and consequently treat a certain number of patients. The basic model of hospital competition is then extended to incorporate the general practitioner (GP) fundholding scheme whereby the GPs are allocated a budget with which to buy care for their patients. Waiting time increases when production of care becomes more expensive, when the benefit obtained from treatment increases, when the unit cost of distance decreases, and when the importance given to time as a performance indicator decreases. The higher the money price the lower the waiting time. Finally, the money price paid by the GP fundholders is greater than that paid by the Health Authorities and greater than the hospitals marginal cost of production. As a consequence, fundholding patients pay a zero time price while non-fundholding patients experiment a positive waiting time.